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Abstract 
At a global level, the last two decades have consistently witnessed the 
encroachment of right-wing rhetoric and anti-minority logos, with several 
states clearly promoting a discourse of fear of minorities. Seeing minorities 
either as the ‘enemy within’ or a political necessity that must be endured, 
states are sceptical in how they recognise or incorporate minority identities 
that threaten ideologies of national homogeneity. Adopting an 
anthropological perspective and having engaged in long-term research on 
minorities in Greece and Italy, I argue that the state selectively recognises 
minority traits that are deemed ‘secure’ enough to be incorporated into the 
national body of policies and governance in what I term opportunistic 
narcissism; the process of highlighting minority differences, territorialising 
them, and finally claiming them for the national corpus. 
 




In Freud’s concept of the narcissism of minor differences, alterity relies upon the degree to 
which Otherness is, or is not, tolerated. In the same vein, traits of minority identity, evoked 
from the top-down (state to grassroots) or bottom-up, may promote certain levels of (in)security 
for minority populations. Is it ever enough for nations to simply recognise the existence of 
minorities without sustainably implementing policies that make them secure? What form should 
such policies take? In Italy, for instance, recognition of linguistic pluralism was a positive 
political step toward secure political representation for minority populations, turning away from 
classificatory systems intimately associated with the aesthetics of language celebrated under 
fascism. In Greece, linguistic difference was not deemed secure enough for official recognition, 
potentially threatening the ideology of national cohesion, yet the state found alternative 
methods to incorporate difference into national repertoires while avoiding direct recognition of 
minority groups. In approaching minority security from the perspective of minor difference, 
there is a fundamental question of belonging premised on a reflexive engagement with the 
Other. 
1. The Enemy Within 
On a sizzling Greek summer afternoon at the end of 2008, I found myself in an interesting 
conversation about the Grecanici, a Greek linguistic minority of Southern Italy with whom I 
have conducted extensive ethnographic research (Pipyrou, 2016). The two Greek women in my 
company were interested to know about the origins of the minority, their language, their 
relations with the Greek state and culture, and whether “they really are Greeks”. This last 
question did not surprise me as it was part of a long narrative cultivated in Greece regarding 
affinity between Greeks (of Greece) and other ‘Greeks’ outside Greece, often referred to as 
‘brothers’. My relatively long response about the influence of Greek nationalism selling a 
particular version of history, the minority as an autochthonous population that speak a variation 
of Greek language, and how the Grecanici define themselves (Italian subjects, Catholics) started 
agitating the women in my company. I was expected (and pushed) to offer a definite and 
affirmative answer of belonging and clear evidence of origins, to subsequently declare that the 
Grecanici of Southern Italy are Greeks. In response to my reluctance to succumb to such a 
demand they became seriously annoyed and argued that “because of people like you, Greece 
will always suffer”. Their argument went that I was a threat to the Greek state and to the security 
of Greece since I was spreading falsehoods that this population was not Greek, thus defaming 
the nation.  
I was neither surprised nor taken aback by such responses. Fellow anthropologists 
 
 
before and since have been targeted as anti-Hellenes when they publish work referring to 
populations in Greece that are ethnically or linguistically diverse (e.g., Karakasidou, 1997). The 
popular argument against these scholars is that difference does not exist in Greece, that all 
people are homogenously Greek, sharing one language and one ethnicity. In my case, I had not 
been subjected to the level of threat (sometimes to life) that other anthropologists have 
experienced, yet nevertheless it was striking how Greek nationals often perceive minorities. 
Now totally enraged, the women went into a manifesto of Greekness, mentioning communities 
all over the world—in Pakistan, Australia, America, the UK, and finally Turkey—who were 
most definitely Greek. When I suggested that ‘Greekness’ was a significant factor in the 1923 
exchange of populations between Turkey and Greece, the answer was that “of course the 
refugees from Turkey had to return to their place of origin—Greece”, despite the fact that many 
had never set foot in Greece, didn’t speak the language, and were united only by shared religion.  
For those of us raised with the generation of people who experienced the last Ottomans 
in Greece, terms such as ‘the state’ and ‘minorities’ were not part of the vocabulary for narrating 
the past. Indeed, not until after World War II did notions of state and minorities become part of 
the everyday lexicon for discussing belonging. Instead, the narratives of the generation born in 
the early 1900s and raised in the Ottoman lands of Greek Macedonia was centred around 
sounds, tastes, commerce, and the struggle of surviving two world wars, a civil war, and 
dictatorship. These narratives would mention fellow co-workers speaking many languages 
other than Greek, and people would often be in the position to speak some of these languages—
they could even teach their grandchildren how to count or understand simple phrases in Turkish, 
Pontian, Vlach, Arvanite, Slavic dialects, or what they would call “Vourgarika” (the Bulgarian). 
Blessed with having had these voices in my life until my 30s, I am reflexively aware of the 
ways in which individual identity was constructed vis-à-vis the state for the generation of the 
early 1900s and the difference in political logos (and socio-national ideologies) from my 
parents’ post-WWII generation. 
Fundamentally, what was communicated through the opposition of the two women that 
summer afternoon in 2008 was a narrative of “anxiety” as “the key emotional response to danger 
or threat” (Freud, 1919, p. 236 in Murer, 2009, p. 123) that I and my research posed to them as 
well as an organisational principal of “ideological and motoric response to threat” (Caruth, 
1996, p. 4). Minorities, and by affiliation researchers working on minorities, are perceived as a 
threat to the hegemonic narrative of the nation-state, attacking social cohesion as agent 
provocateurs, disloyal, traitors. Minorities may be perceived as “substate nationalisms” 
 
 
(Kymlicka, 2002) operating as living organisms and extensions of other, often competing states 
with the potential to make claims to rights that seem threatening (Pipyrou, 2016). As Jane 
Cowan (2007, p. 141) remarks, within a nation-state the motives for minority assertion will 
almost always be met with suspicion and viewed as an implicit threat of political separation. 
National and international agencies as well as NGOs operating around minority protection 
complexify the relationship between nations, minorities, and security. Such actors may 
simultaneously be perceived as a threat to the nation and thus security takes existential priority 
because “if we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will 
not be here or be free to deal with it in our own way)” (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 23–24). While 
eager to tackle security anxieties related to minorities within, at the same time states are happy 
to mask their own irredentist tendencies by branding minorities residing in other states as 
diasporic. Precisely because minorities can provide tangible loci for meddling in the internal 
politics of a foreign state, minorities can be subjected to different kinds of discrimination, 
pressures, and political enticements (Wæver, 1995, pp. 65–71). To secure the flow of 
information and ideology, the state heavily controls, assimilates, and even obliterates its 
minorities (Karakasidou, 1997; Van Boeschoten, 2006). Consequently, research on minorities 
may be censored or simply denied. 
In the post-WWI treaties that re-drew national boundaries, the notion of minorities 
featured as what Schermerhorn termed “a belated supplement” (1978, p. 135) that was also 
grounded in the same norm of homogeneity: same territory, same blood, same people. However, 
European nations were, and continue to be far from homogenous, with various linguistic and 
ethnic groups residing within. After 1945, European policymakers thought it obvious that the 
minority clauses in the Versailles Treaties did not work and for this reason an incredible amount 
of people were moved across Europe to “accommodating locations” (Judt, 2005, p. 27). For 
many decades, European post-WWII governance actively engaged nations in protecting 
minority rights and cultivated a language of pluralism. For a while, as historian Tony Judt 
argued, Europe was: 
a ‘privileged arena’ within which racist language was frowned upon and recent 
histories of violence and extermination were vigorously rejected, [which] 
developed commensurable languages of inclusion and ‘open door’ policies 
supported by legal conventions. (Judt, 2011, p. 105) 
While legal recognition of minorities is admittedly an important step in securing minority rights, 
relevant policies did not have long-term effects. In fact, projects and budgets supporting 
 
 
minorities were first to fall victim to austerity politics, leaving minority groups in positions of 
chronic fiscal insecurity. Especially the last two decades have consistently witnessed the 
encroachment of right-wing rhetorics and anti-minority logos, with several states clearly 
promoting a discourse of fear of minorities. Against this backdrop, refugees coming to Europe 
created new minorities who required accommodation and urgent humanitarian responses and 
generated new security concerns for the host states.  
Adopting an anthropological perspective and having engaged in research on minorities 
in Greece and Italy over the last twenty years (Pipyrou, 2012, 2014, 2016; Zografou & Pipyrou, 
2011), I argue here that the state selectively recognises minority traits which are deemed 
‘secure’ enough to be incorporated into the national body of policies and governance through a 
process I term opportunistic narcissism.  
2. Opportunistic Narcissism 
Through numerous publications, Freud developed a way to understand claims to difference 
arising between groups that share a common identity on one or another level. He noted that 
there is a strong tendency among neighbouring states, and closely related peoples, to exaggerate 
their distinctiveness from each other in what he called the “narcissism of minor differences” 
(Freud, 2010). The bottom line is that similarities and not differences seem to perpetually 
threaten each group’s sense of identity, thus each one clings to some small distinguishing marks, 
investing them with disproportionate significance. It is the commonalities between them that 
drive groups to seek and create differentiation from one another in an attempt to manage “the 
endogenous unease in human society” (Figlio, 2012, p. 8). Looking into the long-durée of the 
Bible, Regina Schwartz (1997) sees the development of identity as a product located in the 
violent distinction between Self and Other. She notes that in the Bible it becomes evident that 
monotheistic traditions enforce a conceptualisation of identity premised on principles of 
scarcity; one God, one people. Traits of uniqueness that render groups and identities authentic, 
identifiable, and distinguishable should be protected and, in the later language of nationalism, 
secured. In this endless anxiety that scarcity entails, every minor trait must be magnified and 
branded as the ‘property’ of a certain identity in order to successfully repel the upsetting facade 
of the familiar (Brooks, 2002). 
An impressive amount of scholarship has been produced discussing nationalism and the 
ways in which nation-states pursue security through the promotion of homogeneity while 
“participants in nation building, raise their voices to and against one another as they try to 
imagine just representations and strategies for the distribution of rights and obligation in a 
 
 
nation of ‘brothers’” (Williams, 1991, p. 4). I suggest that we can scale-up Freud’s insights in 
relation to the ways in which states transform difference from minor to major and vice-versa as 
a politically calculated program that responds to fear of Otherness within. The struggle for 
authentication and nation building often appeals to commonalities shared between nationals. 
However, at the same time, the institutionalisation of commonality or the recognition of 
difference within secure frameworks do not necessarily imply a fair distribution of material 
opportunities and evaluation criteria upon which such classifications are made. Therefore, 
groups that find themselves identified with the less powerful criteria of belonging pursue 
models and strategies of evaluation inextricably bound with “interpretations of the essence of 
that overpowering single ingredient, however bitter the aftertaste” (Williams, 1991, p. 11). 
Anthropologists such as Anton Blok (1998) and Paul Sant Cassia (2006) have taken the 
concept of the narcissism of minor differences and tested its validity in anthropological 
research. Through qualitative and historical contextualisation on a group or national level, their 
studies qualified the thesis that a) in the search for authenticity and self-determination minor 
differences can operate as the distinguishing principle of identity, b) very often, fear of 
sameness leads to violence, c) clear and coherent differential systems may reduce risk of 
violence and even promote peaceful coexistence and, d) nationalism is ontologically premised 
on difference (explicit in Sant Cassia, 2006). Such insights formulate the basis for putting 
forward the thesis of opportunistic narcissism and looking at the relationship between nations 
and their minorities within. Implicitly drawing on Freud’s theory of narcissism whereby the 
‘Self’ must be an ‘Other’ in order to be loved, I ask what happens when these minorities are 
different but not different enough to the nations within which they reside? (Freud, 1990 in Blok, 
1998, p. 35). The emphasis here is on how nations handle manifestations of distinction and 
similarity vis-à-vis minorities and the ways in which they politically appropriate elements of 
minority difference that are deemed ‘secure’ enough to be incorporated into the corpus of 
national identity. 
Therefore, I particularly take security to refer not only to actual threat but also to 
narcissism. What form does a response to fear, risk, and security take when the nation deals 
with that which is not completely unfamiliar or new but secretly familiar and thus frightening 
and threatening? (Freud, 1973, p. 245) (what Freud refers to as the ‘uncanny’). Here I explore 
how difference is materialised in Greece and Italy in relation to specific minorities in order to 
show that the state aims to present itself as both homogenous and unique by encapsulating 
minority difference that can be successfully claimed as national “stuff” (Barth, 1969). In so 
 
 
doing, states such as Greece and Italy may invest in promoting traits of minority identity for 
security reasons and purposely cultivate a framework within which particular aspects of 
differentiation are claimed for all nationals in a form of opportunistic narcissism. This is to say 
that states find a way to accommodate difference in a framework which is non-threatening to 
the national project. The interest lies not in recognising minorities, per-se, but in quashing 
dissenting voices against state ideologies of homogeneity by providing just enough room, on 
the state’s terms, for difference to acceptably exist. National security is thus maintained while 
minority claims to difference are controlled in a manageable way. 
3. The Greek Case: Pontian Refugees from Anatolia 
Since its foundation in the 1820s the Greek state claims itself to be a distinct and homogenous 
body of people who share the same language, religion, education, and history. Conscious to 
stay away from associations with the Ottoman Empire of which Greece was part until 1821 
(and some regions until as recently as 1923), Greek national governments fervently engage in 
a historical constructivism (Faubion, 1993) that promotes certain parts of Greek identity and 
history while masking or aggressively obliterating others. The years that preceded the fight for 
independence from the Ottomans in 1821 were crucial for shaping a particular image of Greece 
as descending directly from Ancient Greece with all the grandness of such connection. Internal 
and external forces—mainly France, Britain, and Russia—portrayed Greece as the cradle of 
democracy from which the light of politics shone on Europe, and also as a victim under the 
sword of the Ottoman conqueror. Almost 200 years later, this connection with Ancient Greece 
is still the stronghold of Greek nationalism and is steadily supported by a number of educational, 
religious, and military institutions.  
Moving forward, after the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, Turkey and Greece exchanged 
populations on the basis of religion and both states saw the influx of a large number of refugees. 
Greece received almost 1.5 million Christian refugees and Turkey around 500 thousand 
Muslims (Pentzopoulos, 1962). Similar to other refugees from Anatolia, Eastern Thrace, and 
Asia Minor, the Pontians—displaced from the Black Sea region—settled in Greek Macedonia, 
critically affecting the “region’s ethnic tapestry” (Karakasidou, 1997, p. 142). The displaced 
populations were by no means homogenous. Despite the fact that they had a common religious 
faith they spoke different languages and dialects, had their own varied customs, rituals, and 
distinct identifications. According to Nikos Marantzidis: 
the myth of the dilemma ‘language or religion’ successfully accommodated identity 
 
 
issues during the Ottoman Empire especially when national identities were under 
construction. It further contributed critically to the incorporation of the refugee 
populations into the Greek national state, thus operating as a tool towards the 
transformation of their identity. (2001, p. 33) 
Accordingly, the national government readily identified Christian refugees from Asia Minor as 
Greeks and as a “critical resource of Modern Greece’s national development” (Voutira, 2006, 
p. 397).  
The reception of displaced people on the local level was often negative. Perceiving 
refugees as threats to their limited resources and community fabric, local populations very often 
adopted a hostile attitude and tended to dismiss them based on ethnic and ideological criteria, 
labelling them as ‘Turks’, ‘Turkseeds’, or ‘leftists’ (Kirtsoglou, 2003) as in the case of the 
Pontians who, during the Russian–Turkish wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, had 
moved farther into the Caucasus and eventually found their way to Greece. At the same time, 
the refugees themselves often promoted a discourse of superiority in relation to mainland 
Greeks while sustaining a rhetoric of ‘paradise lost’ in respect to their lost properties and places 
of origin in Anatolia, cultivating concepts of lost homeland for decades after their displacement. 
Subjected to the nationalistic processes of the Greek nation-state, the Pontians, like other 
refugees, felt the pressing need to ‘belong’ to the national corpus and to this end they engaged 
in selective remembrance and a re-shaping of their identities as simultaneously privileged and 
disadvantaged members of Greek society. 
Over the following decades, the Pontians reconstructed their collective system of 
representation by shaping categories of identity relating to national Greek history, language, 
and dance. In so doing, they engaged in historical constructivism from below; appropriating 
and engaging with Greek nationalistic history in order to claim a place in the Hellenic narrative 
(Zografou & Pipyrou, 2011). Pontian civic groups simultaneously promoted Pontian identity 
traits and cultivated commonalities between Pontians and Greeks, thus critically influencing 
the ways in which belonging was historically and politically imagined. A very telling example 
of this process relates to dance.  
Pontians in Greece are adamant that their Serra dance is the Ancient Greek Pyrrhic 
dance. This belief probably originates in the state’s decision to revive the ancient Delphic 
celebrations in 1927, with the encouragement of the prominent Greek poet Aggelos Sikelianos. 
During this revival, the best Pontian dancers were invited to re-enact the ancient Pyrrhic in their 
performances of the Serra dance. The moving bodies of the dancers represented then at once 
 
 
the continuity of the classical cosmos and its connection to the present. At the time of arrival in 
Greece, Pontic dances seemed very exotic to the eyes of the local populations due to the nature 
of performance and music; however, the martial character of the Serra dance, and its popularity 
in the geo-cultural environment of the Black Sea, made it the perfect candidate for the 
articulation of an ideological and practical claim of continuity and belonging to the Greek nation 
(Zografou, 1989). 
At the same time, in their attempt to negate the negative stereotypical assumptions about 
their origins, Pontians concealed and deliberately excluded from their ‘official’ dancing 
curricula those dances that could render evidence of their Ottoman past. Thus, dances such as 
Male-Male (horos me ta mantilia, lit. scarf-dance), performed by the Metetzidiotes living on 
the frontier of Cappadocia, or dances shared with Armenians, were excluded from the new 
Pontic dancing repertoire. This effort to incorporate a different past into a common present 
shared with the rest of the Greek nation resulted in a homogenisation of the dancing style. 
Regarding the structure of the dancing product, Pontic dancing identity has been fabricated in 
regulated forms that underemphasised the depth of their variation, while highlighting their 
commonalities. From a Pontian perspective, difference was carefully downplayed in order to 
fit and secure national belonging (Zografou & Pipyrou, 2011). 
In the 1980s, Greece came face to face with European modernisation. Having survived 
World War II, a civil war (1946–49), the effects of the Cold War on Greek politics, and a 
military junta (1967–74), the nation entered a period of political and cultural extroversion. The 
coming to power of a socialist government in 1981 initiated an era of political and cultural 
awareness as well as identity-making in relation to Greece’s European counterparts. In this 
context, local communities engaged in an even more dynamic manner with cultural and political 
activity, employing their historical resources to meet ‘sophisticated’ European standards. Under 
socialist leadership, “the ideology of returning to [its] roots” as the safest stance from which 
Greece could face Europe, became ever stronger (Clogg, 1992, p. 44). The new socialist 
government was favoured by the Pontians and, as Richard Clogg (1992, p. 45) notes, it was the 
social rhetoric combined with an uncompromising policy toward Turkey that “struck a 
responsive chord with a significant segment of the electorate”. More than that, the socialist 
prime minister himself, the late Andreas Papandreou, visited the monastery of Panayia Soumela 
(the par-excellence Madonna of the Pontians) as an act of publicly acknowledging the support 
that his party received from the Pontians in the general elections of 1981. This visit successfully 
promoted the importance of the Pontian Madonna in the Greek national conscience, thus 
 
 
connecting a particularistic religious symbol with a national political discourse. 
This positive climate boosted Pontian cultural matters at the national level. Next to the 
already existing and institutionalised national dancing associations, new ones were created with 
the aim of displaying and promoting local dance identities through a re-enactment of 
‘traditional’ culture. In this socio-historic framework, Pontian dance identity started 
materialising on the national level as a celebration of difference-cum-part of the nation. The 
incorporation of Pontic dance into the school curriculum was a major advance of the era with 
enormous political connotations. Additionally, after great pressure from the Pontian 
associations, Pontic dance was included in the closing ceremony of the 2004 Olympic Games, 
officially displaying to the world that Pontian culture was, finally, considered Greek (Zografou 
& Pipyrou, 2011). 
For decades after their displacement, the Greek state was opportunistically selective in 
recognising parts of Pontian identity that were secure enough to be openly adopted. At the heart 
of Greek nationalism is an opportunistic narcissism—the assumption that minority traits which 
do not pose a threat to the nation can be adopted on the premise that it is the Greek nation that 
reaps the political reward; this is a hard boundary that can never be crossed. For Pontians and 
any other minority group to feel secure in Greece, they must declare their belonging by leaping 
into the collective fantasy of the state. 
Opening up discussions of diaspora and belonging along different routes, the case of 
Pontic Greeks of the former Soviet Union who were ‘repatriated’ to Greece after 1991 provides 
a twist to the manner in which the concept of diaspora informs a top-down and bottom-up 
political discourse. What was termed a ‘reverse’ diaspora relates to a process of identity 
formation which consciously and proudly embraces elements of identification of the previous 
country of origin (in this case, Russia) (Voutira, 2006). Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet 
Union also challenged the government’s labelling of them as ‘repatriates’, adopting as a term 
of self-ascription the predicate ‘refugees’ and thus building on a familiar and affective discourse 
of displacement. With Europe currently at the centre of intense media attention and political 
debate about the mass movement of people from circa-Mediterranean conflict zones, more than 
ever we require detailed studies of the lived consequences of displacement and how 
humanitarianism is linked to security risks identified by host states.  
4. The Italian Case: The Grecanici 
From neighbouring Italy, we have a similar story which has been developed in my work with 
 
 
the Grecanici in Reggio Calabria, South Italy (Pipyrou, 2014, 2016). With twelve languages 
officially recognised by the state, Italy can boast the greatest diversity of regional and minority 
languages in Western Europe. The legal framework concerning the governance and protection 
of linguistic rights is drawn directly from the European Union and the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Moreover, under the auspices of UNESCO and other international bodies, the debate over the 
preservation of endangered minority languages has gained momentum in the past twenty years. 
With an ever-increasing engagement in recording endangered languages and promoting 
linguistic rights of minority populations all over the world, there is a fundamental need for 
anthropological research to investigate the links between purely linguistic research, the social 
and political interests of linguistic minorities, and the various levels of governance at which 
minority politics are realised. 
Speaking Grecanico, a language categorised by UNESCO as “severely endangered”, the 
Greek linguistic minority of Calabria is one of two Greek speaking populations in South Italy. 
Italian citizens and devoted Catholics, Grecanici are multilingual. They speak Grecanico (also 
termed Griko and Greco), which is comprised of archaic Doric, Hellenistic, Byzantine, as well 
as local Romanic and Italian linguistic elements, while also speaking the local Calabrian dialect 
and the official Italian language. The Greek presence in Calabria begins with the colonisation 
of South Italy and Sicily between the eighth and sixth centuries BCE and with the foundation 
of the first cities of Magna Graecia (Greater Greece): Reggio Calabria, Sibari, and Croton. This 
period is highlighted by the Grecanici as their time of origin, and they claim identity as being 
direct descendants of the Greek colonisers. After the fourteenth century CE, the Greek language 
rapidly receded, mainly due to political and economic instability provoked by a succession of 
conquests in Calabria. The decline of the Greek language during the following centuries was 
further associated with the abolition of the Christian Orthodox denomination. 
At the time of the unification of Italy (1861) the Greek language was spoken in twelve 
villages in Aspromonte, dropping to nine by the beginning of the twentieth century. In the 1970s 
German linguist Gerhard Rolfs noted that the language was not in use anymore in a further four 
villages. Referring to the considerable publicity and tourist marketing of the area within and 
outside Italy, Greek anthropologist Christina Petropoulou bitterly notes that “if the motive to 
visit area Grecanica was to find Greek speakers then the visitor will be disappointed since the 
language is hardly spoken anymore” (1995, p. 152). Petropoulou refers here to the regular 
disappointment generated during tourist excursions to the area Grecanica by Greek nationals 
who expect (and regularly demand) that local populations respond to them in Grecanico. 
 
 
Area Grecanica is known in Greece as Ta Ellinofona (the Greek-speaking areas), and 
the Greek public has become familiar with the area since the various publications of philologist 
Angela Merianou in the 1960s. At first these publications created an idyllic, exotic, and 
generally distorted picture of the populations and their living conditions. Notions of common 
race and kinship were put forward as important links emphasising the relatedness between 
Grecanici and Modern Greeks. In a nutshell, Grecanici were portrayed as “brothers” descendent 
from an “Aryan race” (the Ancient Greeks) who, living among the “barbarous” populations 
(other Calabrians), managed to preserve their “Homeric Greekness” and their “immortal Greek 
soul and splendor”. They were further coloured as “blessedly backward” with qualities such as 
hospitality “unique in the whole world” and philosophical, poetical, and musical dispositions. 
The extremely harsh conditions of Grecanici life and the miseria (socioeconomic poverty) that 
plagued them before and after World War II were romanticised and ultimately misportrayed 
(see Pipyrou, 2016). 
Grecanici felt “in their skin” what it means to be second-class citizens. Narratives of victimhood 
of the early 1900s are systematically circulated in Grecanici civil society and families, 
communicating feelings of bitterness and ambivalence. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and especially under Mussolini’s policies that fiercely promoted monolingualism, 
minorities in Italy posed a consistent security threat for the fascist government (Cavanaugh, 
2009, pp. 159–160). Alloglot Grecanici children were often the target of discrimination and 
abuse from teachers who spat in their faces, feeling repelled by the language. Subsequently, 
many parents avoided speaking Grecanico in front of their children to shield them from further 
stigmatisation. The Grecanici migration from ancestral villages in area Grecanica to Reggio 
Calabria in the 1950s highlighted once more the degree of prejudice and the divisive line 
between urban and rural populations in Italy (Teti, 1993). Uneasiness looms within every 
narrative regarding those years. Domenico, 54, remembers:  
We were called paddhechi, parpatulli and tamari (all derogatory of peasantry). To 
an extent people still call us these derogatory terms. Until the beginning of the 
1970s there was a street in my neighbourhood called Lu Strittu di Paddhechi (The 
Street of the Peasants). Despite the fact that the majority of us are educated and 
have money we are still perceived as second-class citizens. Paradoxically, the 
language that once brought such problems is now worthy of praise. We must feel 
proud of our language for it is the language of the Ancient Greeks of Magna 
Graecia. Others want to capitalise on our language. They want to claim it for 
 
 
themselves. Once they were spitting in our faces, now they want to claim all the 
privileges of this language. (see Pipyrou, 2014) 
Responding to the exoticism cultivated in Calabria and Greece regarding their ‘origin’ and 
‘heritage’, Grecanico cultural associations founded at the end of the 1960s in Reggio Calabria 
engaged in profound historical constructivism in order to address what they termed the 
Questione Grecanica (the Grecanico Problem). The Questione Grecanica, understood as the 
salvation and protection of the Grecanico language and culture, was a hot political topic of 
local, national, and international import debated by the Grecanico cultural associations. Their 
policy advocated new outreach initiatives to engage with as many Grecanici as possible—both 
in the city of Reggio Calabria and the Grecanici villages—and proposed a new ideology 
regarding Grecanico language, heritage, and patrimony (Palumbo, 2003; cf. Herzfeld, 2009, 
2011). The Grecanico language being considered superior (due to its Ancient Greek elements), 
the Grecanici were encouraged by the associations to embrace their roots and origins. They 
further aimed to initiate substantial links with the Greek-speaking populations of Puglia and to 
evoke an emotive response from the Greek public regarding the minority status of their 
‘brothers’ in South Italy. During the same decade, further associations were formed in Greece 
with the aim to ‘help’ the ‘Calabrian Greeks’ who are constantly threatened morally and 
financially. These associations put forward irredentist propositions based on diasporic 
arguments promoting Greece as the motherland and conceptually expanding the borders of the 
nation. As a result, the Grecanici were, and still are portrayed in Greece as Greeks of the 
diaspora and brothers ‘of the same blood’, but scarcely as an autochthonous Italian population. 
As in the case of Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Union, diaspora refers to 
enclaves of linguistic and ethnic minority groups that reside outside the territory of their 
‘historic homeland’ thus politically ‘stretching’ the borders of the state. It has been suggested 
that the notion of diaspora “denotes displacement in the sense that one lives outside one’s 
primary land of attachment” (Laguerre, 1998, p. 8; see also Clifford, 1994). It refers to 
“individual immigrants or communities who live outside the legal or recognised boundaries of 
the state of the homeland, but inside the reterritorialized space of the dispersed nation” 
(Laguerre, 1998, p. 8). Strictly speaking, the Grecanici are not a diasporic people, in the sense 
that they are Italian citizens, are not immigrants, and have deep historical roots in the region. 
Yet the existence of the Modern Greek nation-state as a point of reference and the relations it 
fosters with the communities creates conditions similar to those of a diaspora (Pellegrino, 
2013). Very often Grecanico associations self-present as diasporic, thereby appealing to 
 
 
essentialist notions of ‘home’ and historical tensions between routes and roots (Ballinger, 2003, 
p. 285; Clifford, 1997; Gilroy, 1996). This tension is located in an existential search for 
authenticity. In the rhetoric of the Grecanico associations, authentic Grecanico culture is always 
rooted in a mythical past that provides the “space wherein which the competing claims of ethnic 
particularity and universal humanity can be temporarily settled” (Gilroy, 1987, p. 154). 
Grecanici communities are approached by the Greek state as diasporic since they seem to act 
as living cultural capital that “expands the space of the nation beyond the borders of the state” 
(Laguerre, 1998, p. 8).  
It should be noted that the extensive publicity given to the Greek-speaking communities 
in both Calabria and Puglia by the Greek mass media has managed to generate strong feelings 
among the Greeks in Greece for ‘our brothers’ in Calabria. Discussing my work among the 
Grecanici with people in Greece, I realised that perceptions of collective suffering are shared 
with circles that are aware of the Grecanici of Calabria. “Imagine how much they must have 
suffered from the suppression of the Italians”, it is often argued. The specific climate around a 
Greek ‘diasporic and suffering civilization’ has been cultivated for decades in Greece since the 
first publications on the area Grecanica in the 1960s. For years, through specific journals, 
cultural associations in Greece expressed their anger and frustration about the “nationally 
insensitive Athens who permits the language of an Ancient Greek civilization to perish”, the 
“Greek state that has eaten Greekness”, and the “pure neglectfulness of the Greek state towards 
its forgotten children” (Petropoulou, 1997, p. 264). The opening vignette of this paper speaks 
directly and/or indirectly to such dispositions against anyone or any group which does not 
necessarily empathise. My own work, coinciding with a period where the name of Macedonia 
in Greece made people jump, added another layer of discontent and sense of insecurity. Back 
then, and equally more recently, it was deemed unproblematic to negate the existence of 
minorities in Greece while welcoming and fervently supporting Greek minorities elsewhere, 
thus emphasising the malleable nature of diasporic groups as existential threat to the host nation. 
The triumph of Greek historical constructivism is apparent not only in history, 
architecture, and other forms of cultural expression (Herzfeld, 1987, 1991; Yalouri, 2001), but 
also in ‘living human artefacts’ and ‘traditional neighbours’. The Greek tendency to approach 
the Grecanici communities as diasporic is further illustrated by the frequent visits of prominent 
Greek political figures to the communities and by the emphasis given to issues of immaterial 
heritage such as language and common cultural and historical frameworks of reference like 
Magna Graecia and the Byzantine Empire. Both the Greek state and the Grecanico associations 
 
 
work toward the idea that ‘old things’ could act as transnational mediators of one and the same 
idea—that of grecita and ellenismo (Greekness and Hellenism). 
In Italy, minority recognition came after many decades of struggle as linguistic 
minorities increasingly played an important role in local and national politics (Cavanaugh, 
2009), cumulating with the controversial Law 482/19997 which promised linguistic promotion 
and protection (Coluzzi, 2007, pp. 57–58). The prioritisation of language over other markers of 
identification, such as ethnicity or race, circumscribed minority recognition within a linguistic 
framework, clearly stripping other threatening references from legal import (Andeva, 2013). 
This created the opportunity to link linguistic minorities in Italy directly with local self-
government. After the demarcation of their territories by the provincial councils, minorities 
recognised by Law no. 482 were granted the right to use their languages in the field of education 
both as a medium-language and as a subject in nursery schools, in primary and secondary 
education, in public meetings, in place names, in the media, and with public administration and 
judicial authorities. Local populations and institutions were determined to make the most of the 
newly found recognition that went some way to addressing the suppression of minority 
languages rooted in Italy’s era of fascism. 
Classified by UNESCO as severely endangered, it is the notion that the Grecanico 
language is distinctive and rich yet ‘in danger of extinction’ that mobilised national and 
international organisations to approach Grecanici as people rather than a linguistic anomaly. 
Since the 1970s the Association Internationale pour la Défense des Langues et Cultures 
Menacées (AIDLCM), argued that Grecanico “could enrich everybody … the loss of which 
would be irreparable … and constitutes a part of the heritage for which Italy is responsible”. In 
1975, AIDLCM claimed that: 
the Greek culture of Calabria lives its last decade … the last Greek shepherds live 
their last humiliation. The Greek community of Calabria constitutes an island 
colonized economically and culturally, in a region itself underdeveloped and 
colonized … a fact for which the Greek community is not responsible. To leave 
things as they are at the moment … would be to bear the burden of a real cultural 
genocide. (AIDLCM, 1975 quoted in E. Nucera, 1984/5, p. 41) 
Apart from highlighting the contribution of Grecanico language and culture toward a general 
Italian public good and the danger of extinction, AIDLCM claims compensation from the Italian 
state on the grounds that Grecanico constitutes an inextricable part of Italian heritage. A 
considerable number of national associations for the protection of endangered and minority 
 
 
status languages in Italy, such as the Lega per le Lingue delle Nazionalita Minoritarie 
(LeLiNaMi) and the Comitato Nazionale Federativo Minoranze Linguistiche d’Italia 
(CoNFeMiLI), talk of the Greek linguistic minority of South Italy as occupying an isola 
(island). The metaphor of an island existing within inland Italy is a strong cognitive sign that 
captures notions of marginalisation, economic and social isolation, and victimhood. 
Epilogue 
Recent studies on minorities have shed light on the historical and political genealogies of what 
is meant by minority status in Europe (see Cowan, 2000, 2010). Scholars have examined the 
historical predicament of developing a comprehensive UN framework toward the protection of 
minority populations after 1918. Looking at the issue of the minorities from a top-down 
perspective, these studies delve deeply into the logics of treaties and the thorny position of 
minority recognition and protection on a pan-European level. Under the auspices of the 
European Union, the CoE, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and other international actors, debate over the preservation of endangered minority languages 
has gained momentum in the last two decades (Schmidt, 2008). Subsequently, after the 
Copenhagen Council of 1993, nation-state recognition of minorities became a criterion of 
identification and EU membership in accordance with a vision of a multicultural Europe 
(Cowan, 2010). For such reasons, as language is intimately attached to minority status, minority 
recognition that can no longer rely on linguistic identification requires a clear legal framework 
that protects minorities within states. 
From a bottom-up perspective, other studies in Europe have highlighted the 
precariousness of the term ‘minority’ for the inclusion of alloglot, religious, and ethnic 
populations as meaningful constituents of the national fabric. As a minority trait, language acts 
as a semantic web of collective identification which may be interlinked with xenophobic 
evocations of ‘second-class’ citizenship, violence, fear, and exclusion. Yet, language 
recognition instead of ethnic recognition is a far less dangerous marker of classifying minorities 
within many states. 
As the two cases from Greece and Italy demonstrate, attempting to belong from a 
minority perspective is not necessarily premised on objective resemblances but is often tailored 
to fit. From a state perspective, narcissistic opportunism involves calculated strategies of 
branding minority traits as pan-national; but this only pertains to traits that are deemed secure 
enough not to pose a threat to ideologies of national homogeneity. An ontological principle of 
 
 
sameness—a fundamental feature of narcissism which allows the state to see the ‘Self’ in the 
‘Other’—acts as the driver behind nationalism, and so, minorities within unavoidably represent 
a disturbing challenge to the claim of homogeneity. Minorities pose a constant political 
dilemma for nations in Europe. A political principle of EU inclusion urges nations to recognise 
and include minorities in their constitutions. However, inclusion would always entail a fear of 
being replaced by the Other and thus becoming a replica of the Other—the minority (Volkan, 
1989). To avoid this, nations develop their agendas through an operation of opportunistic 
narcissism; the process of underscoring minority differences, territorialising, and finally 
nationalising them. Difference is acknowledged within a framework deemed ‘safe’ to governing 
bodies. Furthermore, minority difference is appropriated so as not to produce a rupture or strike 
a boundary between the state and Otherness, but rather to create secure spaces within which the 
state can continually control difference while persisting to fantasise sameness and homogeneity. 
The narcissism exemplified by the Greek or the Italian state is therefore not just a matter 
of exaggerated perceptions of difference (i.e., the state is always different from the minorities 
within) but involves the appropriation of threatening ‘minor differences’ that could otherwise 
be magnified and turned into conflict. Pontic dance, as opposed to Pontic language, was a secure 
enough element to be added to the national Greek educational curriculum—albeit many decades 
after 1922. At the same time, the Greek state readily recognises Greek linguistic minorities in 
Italy as Greek diaspora while it avoids attending to or recognising linguistic particularity within 
Greece itself. In Italy, recognition of linguistic pluralism was a positive political step away from 
classificatory systems intimately associated with the aesthetics of language celebrated under 
fascism. The intention of Law no. 482 of 1999 was to promote linguistic pluralism as a 
‘correction’ of the fascist regime that so brutally suppressed alloglot populations in Italy and 
pursued nationalistic dreams of uniformity. Yet, such recognition premised on language leaves 
out questions concerning markers of minority identity such as ethnicity and race that may pose 
a threat to security. Finally, I propose that in order to sustainably secure minorities, the state 
should go beyond seeing minorities as the enemy within or an excess that threatens ideologies 
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